November 2026

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Fields of Concentration:
Primary: Labor Economics, Industrial Organization
Secondary: Public Economics

Qualifying Examinations Completed:
2023 (Oral): Industrial Organization, Labor Economics (*with distinction*)

Dissertation Title: *Essays on the Economics of Higher Education*

Committee:
Professor Joseph Altonji (Chair)
Professor John Eric Humphries
Professor Christopher Neilson
Professor Seth Zimmerman

Education:
Ph.D., Economics, Yale University, 2027 (expected)
M.Phil., Economics, Yale University, 2024
M.A., Economics, Yale University, 2023
B.A., Economics & Mathematics, Yale University, 2021 (*summa cum laude*; second major: Ethics, Politics, & Economics)

Fellowships, Honors, and Awards:
University Dissertation Fellowship, Yale University, 2026–2027
Carl Arvid Anderson Prize Fellowship, Yale University, 2025–2026
Doctoral Fellowship, Yale University, 2021–2027
Cowles Foundation Fellowship, Yale University, 2021–2025
Phi Beta Kappa, Yale University, 2021

Research Grants:
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics ($43,500), 2023–Present
Roe L. Johns Travel Grant, 2026

Ascendium Education Group Travel Grant, 2026
Yale Graduate Student Assembly Conference Travel Fellowship, 2025–2026
Structural Transformation and Economic Growth Research Grant ($25,000), 2022–2023

Teaching Experience:

Fall 2023–2025, Teaching Assistant and Head TA (2024–2025) for Prof. Benjamin Polak, Introduction to Game Theory (Yale College and School of Management)
Spring 2025, Teaching Assistant for Prof. Marina Halac, Introduction to Game Theory (Yale College)
Spring 2024, Teaching Assistant for Dr. Guillermo Noguera, Introduction to Data Analysis and Econometrics (Yale College)

Research Experience:

Research Assistant to Profs. Costas Meghir and Orazio Attanasio, 2019–2020

Work Experience:

Summer Analyst, Cornerstone Research, 2020

Working Papers:

"Academic Match and the Returns to For-Profit and Public Colleges" (November 2026), *Job Market Paper*

"Can Public Colleges Cater to For-Profit Students?" (September 2026)

"Where Does the Tide Roll? The Causes and Consequences of Out-of-State Enrollment at Public Universities" with Crossan Cooper (October 2026), under review

"Quality Regulation Creates and Reallocates Trade" with Lucas Zavala, Ana Fernandes, Tristan Reed, and Jose-Daniel Reyes (April 2026), R&R at *The Economic Journal*

Work in Progress:

"Returns to For-Profit Graduate Education" with Joseph Altonji and Zhengren Zhu

"Curriculum Design and College Completion: Evidence from Admission Waitlists"

"College Accountability under Student Selection"

Seminar and Conference Presentations:

2026: SOLE Annual Meeting, AEFP Annual Conference, APPAM Fall Research Conference
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November 2026

References:

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Dissertation Abstract

Academic Match and the Returns to For-Profit and Public Colleges [Job Market Paper]

Short vocational college programs can deliver substantial returns (Lovenheim & Smith 2023). Public subsidies for these programs are concentrated in community colleges (CCs), the primary vehicles for vocational training in the United States. Yet CCs graduate only 30 percent of their students, while two-year for-profit alternatives graduate twice that share. This raises three questions: How do for-profit colleges achieve higher graduation rates? Do these gains come at the cost of lower quality and returns? And should subsidy policies be redesigned to expand the supply of attainable vocational programs?

I answer these questions by first estimating the productivity of for-profit and CC programs. Identification is challenging because students self-select into colleges, and college choice is intertwined with program choice: for-profits offer a narrow subset of vocational programs, while CCs bundle vocational, academic, and transfer options. Using administrative records covering the near-universe of two-year for-profit and CC students in Texas, I find that the for-profit completion premium persists within narrowly defined degree programs, and conditioning on pre-college skills only widens the gap. I then use distance instruments to identify effects among students on the for-profit/CC margin, finding that for-profits raise graduation rates by 32 percentage points, with effects largest among weaker students. Yet for-profits' attainable pathways do not lead to less valuable degrees. A within-individual design shows that for-profit and CC degrees confer similar long-run returns. Expected returns at enrollment exhibit substantial match effects: academically weak students gain more from for-profits because they face elevated dropout risk at CCs, while the strongest students earn higher returns from CCs, partly due to the option value of academic and four-year pathways. I collect data on program-level course requirements, which show that for-profits require significantly less academic coursework, a plausible mechanism for match effects.

For-profits achieve comparable, and sometimes higher, returns despite spending less per student, yet per-student tuition subsidies are far larger at CCs. To understand the welfare implications of

this asymmetry, I estimate the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) of extending subsidies to for-profits. Demand model estimates show that students shifted into for-profits come equally from non-enrollment and CCs, but almost exclusively from the bottom of the skill distribution. Each dollar of subsidy generates more than five dollars in additional earnings. Subsidy costs are fully offset by savings from substitution out of already-subsidized CCs and by increased tax revenues, making the subsidy self-financing. The MVPF is therefore infinite even if earnings gains are fully offset by nonpecuniary costs of schooling and work. Expanding private provision of short vocational tracks emerges as an efficient way to build human capital among low-skill students on the margins of higher education.

Can Public Colleges Cater to For-Profit Students?

Many students choose expensive for-profit colleges for vocational training even though affordable public options are widely available. Such choices are often attributed to information frictions, but this view presumes public options provide close substitutes for for-profit programs. I test this premise using a revealed-preference analysis of students' choices after abrupt for-profit chain closures. About 30–50 percent of displaced students substitute to public colleges, but those who do often shift to part-time enrollment, slowing their degree progression. Diversion to the public sector is larger where for-profit and public colleges specialize in similar programs. New public programs introduced under a large community-college grant program erode for-profit enrollment only in overlapping fields of study, reinforcing the evidence that limited substitution stems from for-profits' distinctive vocational programs.

Where Does the Tide Roll? The Causes and Consequences of Out-of-State Enrollment at Public Universities, with Crossan Cooper

Public flagship universities increasingly use nonresident tuition revenues to offset declining state funding. Nationally, we find that public flagships facing lower state support enroll relatively more high-income nonresidents. We then link two decades of University of Alabama (UA) commencement records to admissions office recruiting visits and individual employment histories. These data allow us to document how universities pursue this revenue margin and to measure downstream effects on graduates and state budgets. We show UA boosts high-income out-of-state demand through targeted recruitment visits: in a differences-in-differences design, new visits generate 8–10 percent more future UA graduates. We then trace how nonresident enrollment redirects graduates across state labor markets. Using variation in the state-of-origin composition of UA cohorts and a shift-share instrument constructed from origin states' non-UA out-of-state enrollment rates, we estimate that every 100 out-of-state students cause 9–15 additional in-state students to leave the state after college. These patterns are consistent with peer effects operating through expanded consideration sets and referral networks. The resulting fiscal losses to Alabama exceed the university's nonresident tuition margins. Finally, the out-of-state expansion appears to support in-state degree production. A budget accounting exercise shows that UA's out-of-state enrollment margins are sufficient to cross-subsidize more than half of the in-state cohort, who receive an average annual subsidy of $13,000 per student.